God Shaves with Ockham's Razor

It should be no surprise to anyone who has read my blog that I am a Theist. This means I believe in the existence of God. However, there are those who don’t. We commonly refer to them as atheists. While there are several different arguments for atheism I will be addressing one. That is the natural indistinguishability argument, or the argument from Ockham’s razor. The argument’s basic sketch is that if God exists, since science has shown natural explanations for all observed phenomena, his existence is indistinguishable from nature. Therefore we can use Ockham’s razor to ‘shave’ away God and can justifiably be atheists. There are two problems with this. First, it commit’s the fallacy of composition. That is to say, that because the parts of a whole have some property, then the whole also has that property. This is false. Just because all the parts of nature have natural explanations, that doesn’t mean nature as a whole has a natural explanation, in fact, that would lead explanations ad infinitum. I will be focusing however, on the second and I feel more damaging problem with this argument. That is, even on its own basis, it defeats itself. I will show that the argument fails to apply the full scope of Ockham’s razor and given the razor itself, Theism is actually more preferable in light of the evidence.

Ockham’s Razor: Protection from parsimony

First consider the formulation of the principle of Ockham’s razor. The razor is named after William of Ockham who famously said “we need not multiply causes beyond necessity” and is often used when God is seen to be a ‘cause beyond necessity’. I however find the application only applied to causes to be far to narrow in its scope. Ockham’s razor is almost always used to judge the more preferable of two competing hypotheses and chose the one that better explains the evidence. With this being the case I feel we can reformulate the razor to be stated as: “the less parsimonious explanation is preferable” This formulation preserves the original intent while allowing it to be applied to non-causal hypothesis analysis. The more parsimonious hypothesis is the one that is more ad hoc. That is to say; the one that, in order to accept it, you are required to accept more additional hypotheses than the other.

Atheistic explanations are parsimonious

Let us then consider the stance of Atheism in relation to a question about reality. We shall examine the atheistic position and see what additional hypotheses are required to hold this world view. Lets us then consider the nature of reality. How is it that there exists something rather than nothing at all? On the atheistic standpoint physical reality is on some level a brute fact. This means that it is possible for physical reality to be necessary, that is, a brute fact. Count this as one additional hypothesis that must be accepted to proceed. Now we find ourselves with a problem. Physical reality, at least what we can observe of it, cannot be necessary. The first law of thermodynamics predicts the heat death of the universe in which all matter and energy will eventually cease to exist. Things that cease to exist cannot be necessary. Therefore, on atheism, there must be some higher physical reality that provides for the existence of the one we see, itself being necessary and a ‘brute fact‘. Count this as the second additional hypothesis required for atheism’s account for reality. This is just one example of the atheistic worldview and its parsimonious conclusions.

Conclusion: Theism is preferable

As we have seen, atheism requires additional hypotheses to hold its world view in light of a meaningful question about reality. Theism has no such problem. There is only one hypothesis that is required to hold Theism: that it is possible that a Being such as God exists. Given this hypothesis, God’s being easily provides the answer to the question. This being the case, we can use Ockham’s razor to shave away atheism as the more parsimonious viewpoint. So stay smart and keep thinking!

Poor Sportsmanship in the NFL

       Anyone who has watched the NFL this season and its associated coverage is aware of a problem in the league. The normal Referees have been locked out by the NFL due to labor disputes. In their place, the League has provided replacement refs. They are referees from college, and semi-pro leagues. The result is games that are called very differently than they would otherwise have been, or so most sports pundits would have you believe. Aaron Rodgers of the Green Bay Packers spoke out recently against the replacement refs. The call made on Monday night cost the packers the game, and it followed another controversial call on Sunday night that cost the Patriots a game. The NFL has backed up both calls and yet players, coaches, and sports reporters alike continue the mantra of : Replacement refs are ruining the game.

        However, it seems to me this is a bit misguided. I will concede, as a fan of american football, that perhaps these refs are not perfect nor are they acceptable. We should expect better performance from the officials of the game. This does not in anyway absolve the participants of the game from their lack of sportsmanship.There were two important calls this past weekend that are most complained about. One is the field goal by the Ravens that was close, even if it did go through. The other is the touchdown catch in the endzone on the final play in the Packers-Seahawks game. Several fans, players, coaches, and reporters complained that these calls were egregious errors and show the need for the regular refs. Every year there are several calls that greatly impact the outcome of the game, and yet no one has complained at this level. Both calls, after review by the NFL, were upheld. To me the key difference is that, in these games, the calls favored the team that was not favored to win. Also, the fact remains, that only the ones who lost or were put at disadvantage by these calls are the ones who seem the most upset by them. I understand that you would feel bad if you felt a bad call cost you the game. I personally, can relate to those emotions. The question that I have is how come no one who benefited from these calls seems to complain about the refs on a general level? I understand they wouldn't believe a call that gave them the game was incorrect, but they should still be upset at the general level of disregard for calling certain penalties. This makes it apparent to me that those who complain are merely sore losers displaying poor sportsmanship.

        I would like to bring attention to the fact that I agree the regular refs are preferable. I also agree that the replacement refs have made some bad calls. So why think these complaints are illegitimate? It is because both teams have to play with equally bad refs. In this manner there is no in-equity. The refs are equally bad for both teams, and yet, only when they lose do the players and others associated with the game offer up such vitriol for the replacement refs. This is a text book example of poor sportsmanship and sore loosers. While it is true that we should expect better out of the Refs, we too should expect much better sportsmanship from the preeminent, even the professional sportsmen themselves.

The Argument from Adequate Reality

   Warning: The following discusses God, a controversial topic



       Rene Descartes was a 17th century French Philosopher. He is commonly referred to as "The father of modern Philosophy". He contributed so much to science and philosophy, you certainly now more about him than you realize. His most famous principle is that of Cogito Ergo Sum, or, I think therefore I am. I will be discussing one of his arguments for the existence of god, based in the Principle of Adequate reality.

       The principle of adequate reality states: An idea must have as much formal reality as it has objective reality. What does that mean?

1. Formal Reality: The actual reality of the thing, its exemplification in the world
2. Objective Reality: The Contents of the Idea its self, the reality of the objective.

    The most common example of this principle is that of a unicorn. On the PAR in order for us to have the idea of a unicorn, we must have the idea of as much Formal reality as the unicorns objective reality. We have the Idea of a horn (formal) and the idea of a horse (formal). By putting these together we get the idea of a unicorn (objective). On the grounds of this Principle, Descartes felt he could prove that God exists based on the fact we have the Idea of him.


The Cartesian Sketch

       The argument can be sketched as follows: If we have the Idea of God, then there is as much formal reality as Objective reality in the Idea. So if the idea of God were made up, there would be less formal reality  in the concept itself. This, on Descartes view, was due to the fact that no one in a state of not-having the idea of God, could make it up based on the world around him. So to Descartes the only way man could come to the Idea of God is by experiencing the formal reality equal to it, that is; God's existence. I think we can update this argument for today's reasoning by establishing premises in a deductive argument.

The Three Formal Realities

        I contend that we can establish three possible ways that a person could have the Formal reality for any idea they might have:

1. Experience: This one seems obvious, If you experience something, you have the idea of it. This would provide ample formal reality for any idea
2. Impartment: This is to have the Idea 'Imparted' to you. That is to say, given to you by someone else. If someone draws you a picture of spider man, or describes him to you, you now have the formal reality to hold the idea
3. Synthesis: This is to literally 'make up' the idea. You can't however, think of something you have no idea of, go ahead try it. Whatever you think of you would have some prior experience of its parts and you would synthesize them together to get your idea. Think of Spider-man. Someone who doesn't already have the idea can take a spider's abilities, give them to a man, and have the idea. Now someone who has know idea of a spider could never give those abilities to a man. So for someone to have that idea, he either has to be given the idea of a spider or else experience it himself.

Now with these formal realities, lets apply them to the concept of God:

Objection, Impartment: You only have the idea of God because your Parents/Minister/Bible gave it to you etc.

Under this argument this is completely true. However its not problematic. Whether you take the creationist view of mans existence or evolution, either way, there was a 'first man'. So even if we've all just been 'given' the idea of God, the buck has to stop somewhere. Think about it, who could give the first man the idea of God? A less-evolved monkey? Where did he get it? And on and on ad infinitum. It stands to reason someone had to have the first 'idea of God' But how did he get it?
Thus we can discard this Objection.

Objection, Synthesis: You could come up with the idea of God all on your own.

This one, if successful, is problematic. However we have good reason to think it is not. Remember that the Impartment objection fails. So the man to synthesize God had no prior concept of him. That is to say; to take this view, you must believe that a relatively recently evolved human could look around at the world, and add its elements together to arrive at an infinite being. Lets ponder this. It seems easy that he could posit the Mental or 'intelligent' aspect of god, as he is such a being. Then he would add attributes to an abstract concept of man. He has the strength of two men, no three, no four, etc. However, to completely synthesize the Idea of an Infinitely strong being, he could never stop synthesizing. For on our intuitive concept of God, even a being as powerful as 10^100^100 Suns would not be as powerful as god. Immensely powerful for sure, but not to 'God' Status as it is commonly understood. Add to this the concept of a non-spatial and timeless entity, which we have no experience of, and it becomes an arduous and parsimonious belief to hold. The Reply to this is that these properties are merely the negation of finite properties. That is to say, we negate time and space and thus we have the concept of timelessness and spacelessness. This however seems problematic to me. For think of a man with no concept of God at all. If he negates Both time and space, sure he negates them in his head, but how then does he arrive at any coherent concept of what it means to be non-spacial or a temporal with all the other properties? This incoherence of these properties has long been an objection to God By atheists, such as David Hume. However, This only supports this premise as by some fortune, we DO have the idea of God! So I feel, while this will be the most debated, we are justified in rejecting this Objection


Putting it all together:

So we have seen The three formal realities for an Idea. We have seen ways you might come to the idea of God by these formal realities. We have also seen their shortcomings. This leaves one option that must provide for our Idea of god. Our reasoning thus far can be summarized as follows:

1. The Concept of God is due to either Synthesis, Impartment, or Experience
2. It is not due to Impartment or Synthesis.
3. Therefore, it is due to Experience

The only addendum then is that one cannot experience something that does not exist, as that would be a contradiction. So then we can say if we have experienced god, he exists! Now this is a deductive argument, so in order to deny the conclusion you must deny one of the premises. I acknowledge that the debate over synthesis might be so deep that it will be the focus of any case that uses this argument. So unless you're prepared to debate that, I wouldn't use this argument on an Atheist. Stay smart and keep thinking!

Number 50 is not so good

        Claire McCaskill is running for reelection to the United States Senate. A new campaign video on her website tries to show that she is the most moderate member of the Senate. In the video, she brags about how 'compromise' isn't a dirty word for her and how she works across the isle. I contend that in one sense, compromise is a dirty word and distasteful. I will also discuss how our entitlement programs are untenable, and that no matter how much we like them, somethings got to change.

        Compromise is one of those loaded terms that always seems to generate a 'warm and fuzzy' feeling among the electorate. A common complaint of voters today is that they disapprove of the 'do nothing' congress, and how they wish that both sides would compromise. When it comes to compromise, I believe there are times and categories in which it is inappropriate. Most notably, when in relation to principles. Compromising on some numbers here or there is one thing, compromising on principle is wholly different. I'll give you an example, an extreme one, but a very apparent one nonetheless. Suppose the following bill was being discussed:

                    Side A: "Why can't we come to agreement on the resolution to kill babies? We understand you don't like killing babies, and we're willing to compromise on how many babies we kill. So why can't you agree on some compromise so we can get something done?"

                     Side B: "There  is no compromise to be made on killing babies. It is against our principles, and killing even one baby is to far for us to go."

       Here you see an example of a refusal to compromise. Side B stands against killing babies in principle, and thus to compromise on this would be to compromise the very beliefs that are fundamental to their world view. Side A offers to lower the amount of babies killed, but this doesn't change the fundamental disconnect between the two sides. Its a total loss for side B to compromise on the killing of any babies at all. Thus, they are justified in standing on principle and cannot be attacked for 'obstructing progress'. Perhaps you disagree with their views, but you can't attack them for 'not compromising' as a supporter of A, should your side compromise on principle, you'd likely not care that they 'compromised' the degree to which they let their principle slide.

Objection: Killing Babies is a far to extreme example, what example of such a principle could be found that can show such a disconnect between the parties?

        I offer, that the principle in question, is spending. The Democrats and Republicans have a vastly different view on spending, and thus, it becomes hard to compromise on this subject. The Democrats have repeatedly offered to increase spending less, but still increase it. This is no compromise for the Republicans, as they view the spending situation in this country as untenable and any increase at all is harmful. The fact that you may increase it a little, but still increase it, doesn't solve the problem.

      Now it is true that the Democrats have offered a solution to the spending problem: raising taxes. This is however another topic, as I feel we should remain focused on the issue of spending itself. The reason is, if raising taxes is the solution, you still have the problem of not capping spending. If you raise taxes, you can spend more, but then you need to raise taxes again, and again, ad infinitum. Despite the fact that this is politically unpopular, as we have seen in Greece, the hair of the dog can't out run inflation. Eventually you have to pay the piper.

Example: Medicare

         I will now give an example of how the spending disconnect manifests itself in policy. Entitlements are inextricably linked to spending as they require funding. A large majority of the spending of the United States Gov't is on Entitlement programs. The resulting dispute is that Republicans want to lower spending, and that means cutting Entitlements, Democrats feel that since people rely on these programs, it is wrong to cut them. I offer that not cutting them is tantamount to harm for those depending on them, as well as the fact that people depending on these programs is harmful in itself as it perpetuates the problem of their needing a haircut.

          It should be common knowledge by now, that medicare only has 12 years of solvency left. This means that unless it starts bringing in the required amount to operate as well as an additional 12th of its deficit a year, it will go bankrupt in 2024. Now given inflation projections for the next 12 years, it is highly improbable that any increase in revenue will save it. So our other option is: Cut spending in Medicare.

Objection: People Depend on Medicare, so cutting it will harm them.

          My contention agrees with this statement. However, with this being true, we have two options:

1. Don't cut medicare, and it goes bankrupt: if this happens, then no one has medicare, this I believe is far more harmful than the current enrollees having to deal with less for a few years.
2. Cut medicare, enrollees have less, but it remains solvent: This option rarely gets a good listen. There are several options available for cutting medicare, and I'm not endorsing a specific one. Its either one of these, or loose medicare.

In Conclusion: Putting it all together

        We have seen an example of how compromising on principle is not a good thing. We have also seen an example of a principle that manifests in policy. Now the only question is: How does this relate to Claire McCaskill and Her ad? It does so in this way:

       McCaskill brags about compromise in a principally divided congress. So either you're fine with her not having any principle to stand on, or else, you agree that spending isn't a problem in spite of the evidence otherwise. If you think spending isn't a problem, then its fine that McCaskill doesn't stand on a principle in relation to it, its fine that she does whatever is necessary to pass a bill, regardless of contents. I personally Find her position untenable, and would rather have a dopey-minded Republican voting on principle, than a highly educated Democrat who lacks on altogether.

Heidegger's Hidden inchoherence

       Martin Heidegger was a 20th century German Philosopher who belonged to the school of Continental Philosophy. Continental philosophy is a school that differs from Analytic philosophy in that it seeks to ask questions, and answer them, on the basis of understanding ideas as a whole and their history, rather than Analytic philosophy which seeks to treat each statement as an independent claim and judge their truth independently and then draw inferences on them. Heidegger specialized in the field of Ontology and Phenomenology and the philosophy of time. He is best known for being the one that asked "The Question of Being". 

       The Question of Being is really just that. It is external to the usage of the word "being" and all of its conjugated forms such as "be", "is", "are", "it" and to some extent "that". It really boils down to: "What is Being?" and by that Heidegger meant; What is it, that all things said to have Being share that classifies them as having Being? Heidegger saw the classical metaphysical definition of being: "that which is" To be tautological, circular and lacking. Technically, this occurred before Carnap had developed Internal vs External Questions and the distinction would have been useful to Heidegger. Basically, if being is "that which is" that really doesn't tell us anything about it. For as Bill Clinton once asked "what is is?" or rather, "is" being a conjugated form of "being" creates a rather circular statement. For if being is "That which is" is that not different from saying "being is that which has being" or "to be is to have being". As you can see, we're not really getting anywhere, for the meaning of being has not, and cannot on Heidegger's view, be built or predicated on its own meaning. This is circular reasoning and is fallacious as well as being question begging in argument form.The fundamental problem is, after asking these questions and getting these answers, do you really feel like you know anything about "what it means to be?" or "what is being"? Think about it, you could certainly repeat the answer, but if you asked someone "what is being?" and they responded "that which is!" and you were then asked to go explain that and how it works to someone, wouldn't you think it incoherent babble? Well that's because it is.

     Today we can recognize that Heidegger's Question is use of external language and could most probably receive a more fair shot or answer if it were attempted today. I even plan to do so with a new semantic theory I'm working on I call "semantic quantification". In my estimation the post-Russell philosophers have veered away from this topic due to its heady nature, as well as most people holding the misconceived presumption that Heidegger had the final say that was of any meaning on the topic. However I will show that is not the case.

       Most of Heidegger's contemporary criticism was that in the form of language. His contemporaries said that he made parsimonious use of language that was either unintelligible, necessarily complex, or only served to obfuscate his argument. This, however, I feel can best be attributed to the fact that he was right before Carnap and the study of Semantics had come a long way in the short time after his main work was completed. I also feel it is due to his hidden incoherence as I will show.

       Heidegger's fundamental methodology employed to answer the question was formulated in two ways. First, he posited the thought experiment of Dasein which is a being concerned with Being. Heidegger's view was that all being was pointed at or 'concerned' with something. If we conceived of a being who was pointed at Being, it could perhaps give us insight into how to answer the question as well as some insights to the nature of what exactly we were questioning. Second, he took the continental approach. He sought to attempt to understand the meaning of being by examining its use through the history of metaphysics and examining the fundamental assumptions of the original Greek philosophers. He did this by "deconstructing" the layers of inferences and definitions that relied on an understood meaning of being and attempted to understand it comparatively in relation to its associated inferences.

     I feel Heidegger's fault lie in his use of language, but not in a manner of obfuscation. It is his reliance on an understood meaning of being that under girds his rejection of the Greek metaphysical systems. This can be attributed to the fact that he used internal language to answer an external question, or rather, he simply underestimated the profound depth to which his question shook the whole of thought. For the primary director of his inquiry was the circular nature of the previous definitions of being. That is to say, he believed that tautological or circular answers didn't tell us anything nor did they answer the question in a meaningful way. Can you see the incoherence? That is to say, he rejected the circular definitions because; "There cannot 'be' this sort of reasoning if it is to have any meaning". How is that? How can there not 'be' this sort of reasoning? We have not yet cashed out what it means to 'be' to any effect that it can serve as a criterion of value. How can the answer not 'be' "that which is"? We still have no recollection of this "being" is or what things that posses "being" have. How can we know anything about what can 'be' at all? At least, we can't until he answers the question. This is why his question remains unanswered: Because his motivating principle, his controlling law, itself was predicated on self-defeating logic.

       Now, a proponent of Heidegger might say: "This seems skew to his argument, as he was asking continental questions and analyzing logic is obviously analytic" well this is true. I don't feel this saves his reasoning as just because you ask continental-style question, this doesn't make self-defeating logic valid. There is also the response that it was just a semantic mistake and that he unknowingly went back and forth between internal and external language. Even if this is true it doesn't save his failed approach. I offer that this question cannot be addressed with an ontological predispositions, as it is the very question of ontology itself. This doesn't mean we can all of a sudden make statements outside of logic and have any meaning, though, it just means a different approach is required. In conclusion, I will say I agree with Heidegger in one respect: I believe the best way to answer the question is to look at it as a relational definition. That is we should ask the question of "what is being?" in a sense that takes its relation to other concepts as a dividing or discerning principle. Stay smart and always ask questions!